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Abstract
The current literature on corporate governance in Eastern Central Europe is dominated by 
economic and juridical accounts. It widely neglects the role of politics in the establishment of a 
new corporate governance system in this region. This paper argues that this is a failure because, 
in contrast to popular beliefs, politics is indeed essential for explaining the developments in this 
ﬁeld. By identifying the lacunas of current corporate governance research, this paper provides 
a ﬁrst exploration of how studies of political actors and institutions could enrich the existing 
literature.
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11 Introduction
Corporate Governance has become a buzzword all over the world and this is no different in 
Central and Eastern Europe, but the fact that corporate governance is also fashionable in this 
part of the world might come as a surprise given the enormous range of political and economic 
challenges this region faced during the last decade. Corporate governance is namely sometimes 
considered as a ʻﬁnishing touch,  ʼwhich is only of interest when everything else in the socio-
economic sphere is settled. However, the question of how corporations are governed lies at 
the heart of the economic transition in Eastern Central Europe (ECE). In the transition from 
a planned to a market economy, it is the ways in which corporations are internally structured 
that changed radically and has been the centre of attention. Shareholders, for instance, were 
a hardly known concept during communist rule and the relationship between the corporation 
and other stakeholders such as the state and employees changed fundamentally during the last 
ﬁfteen years.
However, although corporate governance increasingly attracted attention in ECE, the role 
of the factor ʻpolitics  ʼis widely neglected. Most of the current literature is written by economic 
and law scholars and focuses on a descriptive and normative discussion of the necessity and 
practical functioning of corporate governance systems. Questions relating to the politics of 
corporate governance are hardly discussed. No systematic attempts have been made to explain 
why certain corporate governance systems have appeared in the countries of ECE (i.e. Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), nor has the role and power of different actors in 
this debate been closely examined. In this paper I argue that the current literature misses out 
on the crucial question of why corporate governance systems in ECE develop the way they do. 
Furthermore, I will provide a ﬁrst outline of how this void could be ﬁlled.
To this purpose, this paper is divided into four remaining sections. Section 2 deals with 
the neglect of the factor politics in the current literature on corporate governance in ECE and 
argues why this blind spot should be addressed. I will also look at the context of the economic 
transition in ECE that gives the current discussion its own dynamics and explain some of the 
features of this debate. In section 3, I identify the important issues and try to characterise the 
current debate, the dominance of the rational choice approach in the economic literature on 
corporate governance and its consequences for the research conducted (3.1), and the fact that 
almost all literature focuses on the relationship between shareholders and the management (3.2). 
In section 3.3 some corporate governance issues that are speciﬁc for the region are discussed. 
In section 4 I turn to approaches and actors that have been neglected in the current literature. 
I focus on two issues in particular: the ignorance of path-dependency (4.1) and the neglect of 
the role of transnational actors in shaping the new corporate governance system (4.2). In the 
ﬁnal section, I touch upon the question how future research on corporate governance could be 
usefully conducted in the light of the fact that politics do matter when it comes to corporate 
governance regulation.
22 Corporate governance and politics
Although Berle and Means had already identiﬁed some of the major problems that come 
along with the division between ownership and management in 1932, the words ʻcorporate  ʼ
and ʻgovernance  ʼ were not combined until 1977 (Frentrop 2002: 11). The term ʻcorporate 
governance  ʼis relatively new and experienced a high ﬂight only after the mid 1990s1. Despite, 
or perhaps because of, the surge in interest for corporate governance there is no deﬁnition that 
is universally accepted. Most of the literature sticks to a rather descriptive formulation, which 
is often somewhat circular, such as ʼthe question of how corporations should be governed  ʼ
(OʼSullivan 2003: 23). A deﬁnition that is more precise on what corporate governance actually 
is, is offered by Jackson and Aguilera, who deﬁne corporate governance as ʻthe relationship 
among stakeholders in the process of decision making and control over ﬁrm resources (with the 
ﬁrm itself deﬁned as a collection of resources embedded in a network of relationships among 
stakeholders  ʼ(Jackson and Aguilera 2003: 450). This deﬁnition acknowledges one characteristic 
of corporate governance that has been largely neglected within the current debate, namely that 
corporate governance is more than just the relationship between management and shareholders, 
or as Shleifer and Vishny (1996) put it, the question of ʻhow investors get the managers to 
give them back their money  ʼ(1996: 4). Within the popular media and also within the academic 
literature, most attention is given to this issue, whereas the deﬁnition mentioned above indicates 
that there is more to corporate governance than just this relationship. Other stakeholders, such 
as employees, society as a whole and the state also constitute a part of the corporate governance 
discussion. 
The explicit reference in Jackson and Aguileraʼs deﬁnition to ʻthe process of decision 
making and control over ﬁrm resources  ʼautomatically brings in the factor ʻpolitics.  ʼPolitics 
is often deﬁned as a question of power (Goodin and Klingemann 1995, Weber 1978), or in 
the terms of Lasswell as the question of ʻwho gets what, when and how  ʼ(Lasswell 1936). The 
power relations between the different stakeholders are at the heart of any corporate governance 
issue and as political actors and institutions shape the economic and social playing ground for 
corporations, they are important in explaining the outcomes of struggles within ﬁrms. Politics 
ʻcan affect a ﬁrm in many ways  ʼ(Roe 2003: 1) and political forces ʻaccount for the difference 
in choice of corporate governance models among advanced industrial countries  ʼ(Roe according 
to Gourevitch 2003: 1830).
2.1 Corporate governance and the dominant a-political account of the transition in 
East Central Europe
The a-political nature of the literature on corporate governance can be understood when we 
look at the dominating ideas on the economic transition in Eastern Central Europe (ECE), 
namely as a process of state retreat. From this point of view the transition envisages to ʻde-
politicise the economy  ʼ(Estrin et al 2000: 1, see also Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996) in 
favour of ʻapolitical  ʼmarket forces as means of allocation. Where (international) market forces 
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this view is often implicitly and sometimes explicitly combined with the normative idea that 
this state retreat is a positive development (Lipton and Sachs 1990).
Yet this description of the transformation process only covers half the story. Whereas 
on the one hand the states throughout the world have indeed loosened their grip on national 
economies, they have on the other hand actively chosen the means and rules by which this 
process took place. According to Panitch the process of economic restructuring was actively 
directed and guided by politicians, who were able to gain political strength by means of this 
strategy (Panitch 2000: 6).
Examples of these new rules allowing markets to operate freely are the constitutional 
safeguards for international capital. These safeguards have been actively advocated by 
the international ﬁnancial organisations and this corresponds with what Stephen Gill calls 
ʻnew constitutionalismʼ. According to Gill (1998: 1) this ʻis a particular set of political and 
constitutional changes linked to the reconstitution and protection of capital on world scaleʼ. 
Gill just like Panitch, places this process in a context of new active involvement of political 
elites with the (inter)national economy. This strategy involves a ʻmore conscious emphasis on 
actively moulding and reinforcing the state to provide a more stable political environment for 
capital (ibid).  ʼThese kinds of accounts call for a closer examination of the role of politics in 
the economic restructuring in ECE and contest the assumption that economic transition is only 
about de-politicising the economy. 
Corporate governance issues are closely related to more general literature on the 
economic and social restructuring in ECE, which is normally referred to as a ʻdual transition.  ʼ
As the term ʻdual  ʼalready suggests there are two different, though intertwined, processes. First, 
there is a body of literature that focuses on the political transition from state socialism towards 
liberal democracy and places much emphasis upon questions of democratic consolidation and 
the role and constitution of new political elites (for example Gunther and Higley 1992, Higley 
et al 1997, Higley and Lenyel 2000, Wasilevski 1997, Best and Becker 1997, Elster et al 1998, 
Diamond 1999). Secondly, there is a strand of literature that discusses the economic transition 
from a state led mode of production towards a market orientated one, in which there is some 
attention for issues regarding corporate governance (for example Börörcz 1992, Köves 1992, 
Richter 1992, Balcerowicz 1993, 1995, Frydman 1993, Frydman et al 1993, Gowan 1995, 
Holman 1995, Cox and Mason 1999, Andor 2000, Schütte 2000).
During the last years of the communist regimes and the ﬁrst years of the transition the 
focus was upon liberalisation of prices and the imposition of ﬁnancial discipline. After this 
ﬁrst step of liberalisation, most emphasis in phase two was placed upon the restructuring of 
property rights. Privatisation became the buzzword as the countries of the former Visegrad 
group adopted different approaches towards the restructuring of ownership. In the early 1990s, 
privatisation was at the heart of the political and academic debate or as former Czech minister 
for Privatisation Dusan Triska put it: ʻ Privatization is not just one of many items on the economic 
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However, when the ﬁrst two waves of the transition process had passed by, privatisation 
proved not to be the panacea many had hoped for. Although the private share in GDP went 
up, none of the former communist countries, except for Poland, had reached the 1989 GDP 
level in 1997. Furthermore, the transformation had been primarily focused on the downsizing 
of production, assets and employment. This defensive strategy was not accompanied by any 
deeper restructuring aimed at investments and innovative business strategies as the World Bank 
in 1996 reported (World Bank 1996: 47).   
The literature on the economic transition contributes these developments to the lack of 
proper institutions to guide the transfer of property and regulate corporate control in the newly 
privatised companies. Privatisation without underlying corporate governance mechanisms does 
not ʻclearly solve the problem of having well-identiﬁed private owners who actually control 
and govern newly privatised enterprises… qualitative privatisation could only be achieved by 
coming to grips with the corporate governance issues  ʼ(Andreff 1996: 59- 60).
 Acknowledging these problems, governments turned their attention to mechanisms ʻto 
remedy problems identiﬁed through he experience of the initial legislation, to improve the 
quality of law-making and law-enforcement, but also to offer more effective and forward-
looking solutions  ʼ (Dragneva and Simons 2001: 94). Corporate governance issues therefore 
constitute the third step of the economic transformation in ECE.
3 Dominant approaches in the current literature
Although the introduction of corporate governance regulation is an intrinsic part of the transition 
process, its measures ʻrequire separate political initiatives  ʼ(Johnson and Shleifer 2002: 2) that 
do not necessarily follow from other parts of the transition. And despite the fact that issues 
related to corporate governance often arose from underperformance in the area of privatisation, 
they have developed themselves as a strand of its own. In this section I focus on the dominant 
theoretical approaches and sketch the most important areas of interest. 
3.1 The dominance of the rational choice approach and the lack of the factor 
ʻpoliticsʼ
There is a theoretical dominance of a neoclassical economic approach in corporate governance 
research on the countries of Eastern Central Europe (f.i. Lipton and Rosenblum 1991, Frydman 
et al. 1993, La Porta et al. 1999a, 1999b, 2000, Johnson et al 2002). In short, this approach departs 
from the premise that we can arrive at macroeconomic statements ʻfrom ﬁrm microeconomic 
foundations  ʼand that ʻall explanations of social phenomena have to be couched in terms of 
statements about individuals  ʼ(Hodgson 1988: 53). Politics in the neoclassical sense might be 
deﬁned in terms of markets in which the different actors engage in exchange with the purpose to 
fulﬁl their own (individual) preferences (Hoogerwerf 1991: 119). This dominant presence of the 
neoclassical economic approach, which bears great resemblance with the rationalist accounts of 
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major consequences for the nature of the existing literature. 
 As Richard Higgot (2000: 144) states, the rational choice approach often tends to make 
ʻlittle attempt to understand governance as issues of politics and powerʼ. In the case of the 
literature on corporate governance in ECE this statement seems to hold. Both prescriptive and 
descriptive literature on corporate governance in ECE treat the decision-making process as a 
merely technical, and thus de-politicised, process.
 The rational choice approach also neglects the question of how preferences are deﬁned. 
Constructivists however rightly argue that ʻindividuals must not be seen as presocial entities  ʼ
(Van Apeldoorn et al 2003: 31). We thus have to ask ourselves how actors arrive at their 
deﬁnition of their own economic interests. In the case of corporate governance in ECE hardly 
any attempt has been made to explain where the current ideas of ʻgood corporate governance  ʼ
stem from. And, as ʻideas and ideologies play a crucial role in deﬁning social categories and 
social expectations  ʼ(Woods 1995:  170) and thus inﬂuence policy making, it is this question 
which is of special importance. 
 Departing from the idea that economic ideas do not come out of nowhere but are subject 
to social struggles, an analysis of what is considered good corporate governance, and why, is 
essential. Here the neglect of international actors, to which I will turn later, might be of special 
interest, as ʻinternational institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, are very inﬂuential 
in facilitating a particular world economic view  ʼ(Woods 1995: 169).
In other parts of the corporate governance literature the discussion on the inﬂuence of 
the factor politics is very much alive. ʻNo one really doubts that politics has something to do 
with corporate governance, but theorists vary considerably in the status they give to politics in a 
causal model  ʼreports Gourevitch (2003: 1831). Roe (2003) considers politics to be the primary 
factor in explaining the differences between corporate governance systems, whereas La Porta 
et al. (1999a) point at the quality of corporate law as the most important factor in understanding 
the different systems.
Despite these differences Roe, La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
all challenge ʻimportant literature in economics that argues that the efﬁcacy of the market 
makes regulation unnecessary and renders variation among governance forms unimportant or 
nonexistent  ʼ (Gourevitch 2003: 1832). In contrast to this Coasian position that law does not 
matter with regard to output of corporation attention, an increasing number of scholars take the 
position that institutions do matter. Coase (f.e. 1988) assumed that under ideal circumstances, 
i.e. when there are no transaction costs, it does not matter how the property rights are allocated. 
As long as ʻpeople can trade their assets in order to achieve efﬁcient allocation  ʼ(Blaszczyck 
2004: 3) the initial allocation of property rights will almost automatically be changed into the 
most efﬁcient one. Laws and other regulations are in this respect considered to be irrelevant 
as long as they do not hinder efﬁcient allocation. In all, ʻthere is no pronounced relationship 
between the type of ownership and performance  ʼ(Blaszczyck et al. 2004: 1, see also Williamson 
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company and not the ownership structure.
This view has become increasingly criticised. Coffee Jr. even goes so far as to argue 
that a new spectre haunts ʻthe neo-classical theory of the corporation. It is the spectre that law 
matters  ʼ(Coffee Jr. 1999: 1). The assumption that law and ownership matter, lies at the centre of 
the argument in favour of the privatisation process: privatised ﬁrms are assumed to outperform 
state owned ones. In direct relation to corporate governance relatively much attention is devoted 
to the impact of law traditions. The differences between common law systems and civil law 
traditions received considerable attention (La Porta et al 1999, Glaeser et al. 2001). Here it 
is argued that the former would outperform the latter (see for instance Johnson and Shleifer 
2002). Furthermore, the question which institutional setting would create the best climate for 
investments is addressed. In this respect attention was focussed on the protection of minority 
shareholders and the risk of ʻtunneling  ʼby management.
3.2 The dominance of the shareholder-management relationship
Apart from the bias towards neoclassical theory in the ﬁeld of economic accounts on corporate 
governance, another bias catches the eye. As Dragneva and Simons (2001: 93) state, the current 
literature is rather one-sided and reﬂects ʻone particular corporate governance paradigm: that 
of the company as a closed system of governance limited only to shareholders and directors 
(managers) and concerned (primarily) with ordering the balance between them.  ʼThis bias is 
mostly reﬂected in the juridical literature on corporate governance, but also here the factor 
politics seems widely neglected. 
As Lipton and Rosenblum (1991: 187) argue, ʻcorporate governance is a means, not 
an end. Before we can speak intelligently about corporate governance, we must deﬁne its 
goals.  ʼIn practice however, the answer to this question is rather one-sided. As I have pointed 
out in the introduction, corporate governance is normally regarded as an issue that only deals 
with the problems that might occur when ownership and management are not in the same 
hands. This implies that other stakeholders, (unionised) labour most dominantly, are being 
neglected. Dregneva and Simon are right when they argue that ʻreception has been a powerful 
force in molding the emerging regulatory patterns in Eastern Europe, including in the realm 
of corporate governance  ʼ(Dragneva and Simons 2001: 93). In this sense the current popular 
and academic debates on corporate governance diminish the already existing weak position of 
these stakeholders. Current analyses have not addressed the question of how others actors than 
shareholders and management are involved.
The bias towards the relationship between shareholders and management is ubiquitous, 
though the literatureʼs bias also stems from the fact that, as I have indicated above, most 
literature on ECE is inﬂuenced by the debates on privatisation and is thus primarily concerned 
with property rights2  (Stiglitz 1999, Dragneva and Simons 2001: 93). The distribution of 
corporate control in ECE is different from elsewhere in the world. During the ﬁrst years of 
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had ownership rights too (idem: 10)3. Based on his analysis of the Czech privatisation process 
Palda concludes that the former nomenclature is the biggest winner of the ʻ chaos in the ﬁnancial 
structuresʼ. At the same time he predicts a ʻslowly evolving hybrid of German and American 
governance systems will emerge  ʼ(Palda 1997: 93). Meyer also observes converging tendencies 
although he agrees with Palda that ʻthe convergence to West European or Anglo-Saxon systems 
of governance is slow  ʼ(Meyer 2003: 30).
3.3 Speciﬁc corporate governance issues in East Central Europe
The major issues of current research directly follow from this restructuring of corporate control 
during the ﬁrst years of the transition. Alongside the issues discussed above, three other major 
issues can be identiﬁed: minority rights, the role of investment funds and the question of who 
guards the guardians. The issue of minority rights deals with the problems that arrive from the 
fact that in corporations with a large shareholder, this shareholder might be inclined to use his 
power to harm smaller shareholders. Minority rights protect those smaller shareholders from 
being robbed at the beneﬁt of the large shareholder. These rights are ʻcrucial because, in many 
countries, the expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors by controlling shareholders 
is extensive  ʼ(La Porta et al 2000: 4). This clearly happened in the Czech Republic where it 
was relatively easy to strip a corporation of its value after gaining control over it. The mode 
of privatisation here, a voucher system, led to a highly dispersed system of shareholding and 
chaos in ﬁnancial structures.  Investment and privatisation funds (IPFs) got their hands on over 
50% of the shares and, as they were alleged to act in favour of the fund managers instead of the 
shareholders, those who indeed ʻowned  ʼthe corporation did not proﬁt from it.
Problems like the ones in the Czech Republic raised the attention to other legal structures 
as well, such as bankruptcy rules. Take-over and bankruptcy regulations can be ʻviewed as the 
central ingredients in the market for management  ʼsince they are the means ʻby which control 
rights get shifted  ʼ (Stiglitz 1999: 46).
Other countries, which had adopted other privatisation schemes, suffered less or 
other problems. Sales to foreign investors, as was the case in Hungary, caused less corporate 
governance problems (but all kinds of other problems). Management Buy-Outs and Management 
and Employee Buy-Outs were dominant in Poland, which allowed insiders to get ownership of 
the companies they used to work for. This procedure was politically controversial and raised the 
question of fairness as those who worked in good performing companies were better off than 
those who worked in poorer functioning (Meyer 2003). 
Although states adopted different strategies, it is not to say that all options open to 
Western countries were available in ECE. On the one hand for example budget deﬁcits urged 
states to sell some of its major industries to (foreign) investors, whereas on the other hand the 
absence of (functioning) stock market during the ﬁrst years is considered as hindering effective 
corporate governance. 
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Investment Funds. Governments, or in some cases individuals, have established these funds to 
coordinate the privatisation process, or as more critical voices tend to say, to proﬁt from the mass 
privatisation that took place in the region. Estrin et al. argue that here ECE is clearly distinct 
from other market economies in which ʻinvestment funds do not normally play a signiﬁcant 
role in enhancing or inhibiting corporate governance  ʼ(Estrin et al 2000: 2). National investment 
funds can, to a certain extent, be regarded as institutional investors, namely in the sense that 
these funds often hold the shares (or some functional equivalent) of individual citizens and 
are thus able to inﬂuence the way a company is run, most notably by using ʻvoice  ʼ(following 
Hirschman 1970).
However, as I have indicated above, the weak institutional environment in which these 
funds operate allows them to operate in their own (managerial) interests rather than in the 
participantʼs interests. Banks that play a vital role in most of these privatisation funds tend to 
have another agenda than the small investors who have put their money in such funds (Estrin 
et al. 2000).
Substantial literature is therefore devoted to the question ʻwho guards the 
guardians?ʼ(Stiglitz 1994, 1999; Estrin et al 2000; Herbert and Dockery 1996a and b; Ellerman 
2001). This discussion draws the issue of corporate governance from its initial playing ﬁeld, 
that is the ﬁrm, to a higher level of governance, namely banks and investment funds. The key 
actors however remain the same, owners and management. Therefore, this is only a shift of the 
problem to a different level rather than a solution for real corporate governance problems. At 
the same time the role of governments in regulating these funds has not been in the centre of 
any of the current inquiries on the investment funds.
4 Neglected issues and approaches
As a result of the dominance of economic and juridical literature, the existing literature lacks 
theoretical approaches that depart from something other than a micro- or meso-theoretical 
framework. From a political science perspective this is a clear void, since the literature now 
does not relate to the developments in this ﬁeld to larger developments in the region. At best 
we ﬁnd references to the privatisation process. Although these references are often useful, they 
are only presented to introduce the corporate governance problematique and tend to deal only 
with the economic aspect of transition. As the political struggles over corporate governance are 
hardly discussed, almost nothing is said on the relationship between the corporate governance 
issues in the region and the larger political processes. The latter seems to be a feature of most 
of the work on corporate governance, although there are some exceptions. Bieling (2002), for 
instance, discusses the current West European developments in the area of corporate governance 
in the framework of a larger transformation of socio-economic and political restructuring. Also 
within the debate on the varieties of capitalism, to which I will turn shortly, developments in the 
ﬁeld of corporate governance are linked to a wider discussion on the future of capitalism.
94.1 The neglect of path dependency
There are other approaches which have contributed to the ﬁeld of economic transition that 
are lacking in the literature of corporate governance, path-dependency being one of the most 
prominent examples (Hausner et al 1996, Stark 1992, Stark 1996, Stark and Bruszt 2001, 
Grabher and Stark 1997, Offe 1997, Whitley 1999). Theories drawing upon path dependency 
stress the ʻcritical role for timing and sequencing  ʼ (Pierson 2000:  263) and most of these 
analyses share a more critical judgment of the neo-liberal agenda that has become dominant 
both politically as well as academically, as they argue for a more gradual approach towards the 
economic transition.
Analyses based upon path-dependency start from the observation that cases tend to 
react differently to the same kinds of developments. In order to explain these differences path 
dependency looks at the speciﬁc historical, social, cultural, economic and juridical factors that 
shape political outcomes.
Path dependency draws upon the theories of historical institutionalism, an approach 
which claims ʻthat choices formed when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is 
formulated, have a constraining effect into the future  ʼ(Greener 2004: 2, but also see Hall and 
Taylor 1996, Koeble 1995, Peters 2000). Notwithstanding the various ways in which the path 
dependency approach is being used (idem: 4), its focus on the ʻthe embeddedness of economic 
behavior  ʼ (Granovetter 1985: 482) allows for an approach that goes beyond a technical, a-
political discussion of issues related to corporate governance.
With regard to the area of corporate governance there are already some approaches that 
come close to or directly refer to theories regarding path dependency (for instance Bebchuck 
and Roe 1999, Groeneveld 1995, Frentrop 2002). In this work the existing historical, juridical 
and cultural context is taken as a starting point for analysing and explaining the corporate 
governance systems. Its major ﬁndings argue that there is continuity within a system and 
differences between different national systems. Two different sources of path dependency 
discerned: (1) structure-driven path dependence, ʻthe effect of initial ownership on subsequent 
ownership structures  ʼ and (2) rule-driven path dependence which relates to ʻthe effect that 
initial ownership structures have on subsequent structures through their effect on the legal rules 
governing corporations  ʼ(Bebchuk and Roe 1999: 1).
However, despite its presence within the broader context of the transition, path 
dependency with regard to the development of a corporate governance system in ECE is still 
lacking. Moreover, many contributors to the ECE corporate governance debate take insufﬁciently 
into account ʻthe implications for the implementation of systems borrowed from elsewhere of 
the historical and cultural context of the reforms  ʼ(Wright and Chiplin 1999: 1194).
Federowicz rightly points at one of the weaknesses of a too broad path dependency 
approach, namely that in ʻpost facto explanations everything might be interpreted as path-
dependent, but it offers little insight into the mechanisms of institutional change  ʼ(Federowicz 
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2003: 5). He calls for supplements to this approach and in his edited volume provides one of 
the few attempts to use certain features of the path-dependency approach in order to make sense 
out of the developments in the area of corporate governance in ECE (Federowicz and Aguilera 
2003).
Over the last few years, the path-dependency literature on corporate governance in the 
OECD world has been dominated by the debate on the varieties of capitalism (VoC). This 
debate was initiated by Michel Albertʼs work Capitalism vs. Capitalism (1991) in which Albert 
proclaims that although the European model of capitalism is in the long run more successful in 
obtaining economic growth and stability, the Anglo-Saxon type of capitalism is due to prevail 
because of its aggressiveness. This discussion on the different types of capitalism offers new 
ways in which corporate governance can be discussed. It is widely accepted that corporate 
governance systems in the different capitalist states tend to vary. Although not everybody 
agrees on the amount of capitalist varieties there are, it is beyond doubt that there are substantial 
differences between the different Western capitalist states and that these differences are also 
reﬂected in the way companies are governed and the manner and extent to which governments 
are inﬂuencing this governance (Hall and Soskice 2001). The question that now arises is how 
the ECE countries ﬁt into this categorisation of capitalist variety, given that they had to construct 
a new institutional system from scratch.
4.2 The ignorance of transnational actors
The task of developing a new institutional system from scratch has attracted considerable 
attention, especially from international actors, who considered ECE as a ʻtesting ground  ʼfor 
several new policies (Deacon e.a. 1997: 149). Their role on the transition process is theoretically 
underdeveloped. The autonomy of national politics is implicitly taken for granted in the vast 
majority of literature. Theoretically speaking, domestic actors are considered to be relatively free 
in their actions as Eyal for instance argues that ʻdespite the “pressures” of the world economic 
system, and despite the near-identity of rhetoric in support of the market, domestic factors play 
a major role in determining what kind of capitalism will emerge  ʼ(Eyal 2000: 53). 
So Shields is right when he states that globalisation and foreign actors in most of the 
transitional literature are considered as ʻan external concern… in a secondary constraining 
sense rather than determining  ʼ(Shields 2004: 132). This is not to say that the latter approaches 
do not recognise the impact of transnational forces, but they try to downplay their importance or 
explain their inﬂuence by domestic (or at ʻbest:  ʼregional) developments. Meaney, for example, 
has argued that the reason why the new ministries of privatisation, which were dominated by 
foreign experts, were so inﬂuential during the transition process is to be found in the fact that 
the ʻold  ʼministries were highly suspect given their role during the communist rule and the 
start of the transition process dominated by ʻspontaneous  ʼand insider privatisation. (Meaney 
1995).
Even of an inherently transnational phenomenon such as foreign direct investments 
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(FDI), its political nature and its consequences for the political balance of power in the region 
are hardly investigated. FDI has played an important role in the rise of corporate governance 
issues on the economic agenda, as foreign companies were very reluctant to invest in states 
where their money would not be safe. FDI also deserves clearer conceptualisation because it 
is said to be the panacea that privatisation was not. ʻThe overwhelming ﬁnding from transition 
economies, at least in Central and Eastern Europe, is that outside, preferably foreign, investors 
are crucial in bringing about active and deep restructuring  ʼ(Berglöf and Von Thadden 1999: 20). 
FDI is hence considered to do, what privatisation did not- transform the economy successfully- 
by making key contributions in three areas: capacity building, access to capital and corporate 
governance. Foreign-owned corporations are said to be more active in restructuring, invest more, 
have higher export growth, introduce more new technologies and because of their ﬂexibility they 
are able to enforces higher standards for company performance, also in the ﬁeld of corporate 
governance (Meyer 1997: 2- 10). Based upon these ﬁndings Berlöf and Von Thadden argue 
for external conditionality to strengthen the forces that argue for institutional reform and the 
protection of foreign investors (Berlöf and Von Thadden 1999: 26). Although this is a normative 
statement, the actual inﬂuence of FDI on the political struggle over the implementation of a new 
corporate governance system is hardly investigated. At best we ﬁnd the acknowledgement that 
FDI inﬂuences domestic political struggles, which might liberate the state from ʻthe power of 
local economic elites  ʼ(Ádám 2004: 6). However even in his account the ontological primacy 
of the state remains untouched.
If transnational actors and their role on the economic transition are taken into account, 
only a few of them are indeed mentioned. Transnational think tanks and NGOʼs are almost 
always ignored. Only formal institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, are mentioned 
(e.g. by Meaney 1995), and even their inﬂuence on the implementation of a new corporate 
governance system has not yet been thoroughly investigated. In other areas, such as stabilisation 
and privatisation, the Bretton Woods Institutions  ʼ (BWI) inﬂuence has attracted scholary 
attention, but this is far less the case when it comes to the other actors mentioned above and 
even regarding the BWI  the current literature tends to ignore their (informal) inﬂuence on the 
political and economic transition in ECE. At the same time, however, it might be suspected 
that these organisations have had more inﬂuence than elsewhere since the formal economic 
and political institutions in the region have been in ﬂux during the last ﬁfteen years and have 
allowed for other than the usual actors to inﬂuence developments.
In the broader ﬁeld of literature on the economic transition in ECE, there are approaches 
that do not take the state as ontological primacy (Cox 1992, Böröcz 1992, 1999, Holman 2001, 
Janos 2001, Shields 2002, 2003, 2004). What these authors have in common is that they place the 
developments in ECE in a wider framework, either as a transition from ʻ one international regime 
to another  ʼ(Janos 2001) or as part of a neo-liberal project aimed at the incorporation of ECE in 
the world economy (Shields 2002, Holman 2001, Cox 1992). These approaches, however, are 
often very abstract and have hardly touched upon issues related to corporate governance. At the 
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same time most authors implicitly look at international actors as a unitary bloc. In the light of 
the broader discussions on corporate governance it is questionable whether this is fruitful point 
of departure. In the next section I will argue that the VoC approach discussed above might help 
us to break up this unitary view. At the same time a focus on the role of transnational actors 
might help the VoC literature to overcome its bias towards the differences between states and 
lead them to a path that also recognises the similarities and tries to theorise them.
5 A call for the introduction of a transnationalised version of the Varieties of   
 Capitalism in ECE
As we have seen in the previous sections, the discussion on corporate governance has its distinct 
features that are related to the rise of the debate, and to the economic and juridical approaches 
that dominate the ﬁeld. As I have pointed out, the current research neglects the political struggle 
over corporate governance and the role of transnational actors. The current literature is either 
rather normative or technocratic, which can be considered to be a lacuna from a political science 
perspective. In this last section I want to draw on some of these challenges stemming from the 
current state of the literature and try to sketch how we might come to terms with this challenge, 
or in other words, how we could bring politics and transnational actors back in the discussion 
on corporate governance in ECE. I will argue that the debate on the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) might provide a good starting point for further research. It allows us to step away from 
the narrow economic and juridical bias of the literature. As this debate leaves ample room for 
the discussion of political factors, it might contribute to a better understanding of the political 
struggles over corporate governance in ECE. By theories based on VoC we might come to terms 
with at least two of the voids in the current literature. 
The VoC-debate has not yet reached ECE. In the literature we ﬁnd no more than scattered 
references to the Anglo-Saxon and Continental type of capitalism (Palda 1997, Meyer 2003), 
but no systematic analyses have been made to take this debate out of its predominant West 
European context and apply it to a region that has recently entered the EU or is hoping to do so 
during the next coming years. This introduction of the VoC-debate offers a prospect of coming 
to terms with at least two lacunas in the current literature on corporate governance in ECE. 
Firstly, it can contribute by relating developments in and political discussions on corporate 
governance issues to a wider political and economic context. As the discussions on corporate 
governance are only a part of a larger discussion on the future of national and transnational 
economic systems, it presents on the one hand inductive evidence for developments that go 
beyond the ﬁeld of corporate governance alone and on the other hand we might be able to relate 
developments in the corporate governance system to larger developments in the socio-economic 
ﬁeld. In this way the VoC approach introduces a broader perspective than current literature on 
corporate governance offers. 
Secondly, the VoC approach might help to overcome the bias of the current literature 
towards the rational choice approach. As the VoC departs on a broader political and economic 
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perspective, it enables us to move beyond the current focus on microeconomics and offers 
us the opportunity to focus on political struggles over the implementation of a new corporate 
governance system.
On the other hand however, the VoC approach -just like the current literature on corporate 
governance in ECE- struggles with the question of transnational phenomena and actors. The 
comparative character of the approach leads to a focus on the differences between states, 
economies and societies. These differences are of importance, but the current work on the VoC 
neglects the similarities in the policies (Strange 1997). These similarities are as important as 
the differences, because together they allow for deeper insights in the developments at hand. 
Accounts that focus on the role of transnational actors might enrich the current nation-state based 
analysis of the VoC with a transnational perspective, which strengthens the broader economic 
perspective the VoC approach claims to have. It transcends the mere comparison of nation 
states without rendering them totally irrelevant. At the same time the VoC approach might 
enrich the analysis of the agendas of transnational actors. The nature and the agenda of these 
actors might be more diverse than we would expect based on the current literature. The VoC 
approach might contribute to breaking up the current unitary approach allowing for different 
transnational agendas to interact with each other and domestic ones at the same time. This 
would be even more the case if we also focus on those organisations and networks that up till 
now have received hardly any attention. In the ﬁeld of economic transition actors as the Adam 
Smith Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and others might have exerted considerable 
inﬂuence, either ﬁnancially or technically. Here the VoC-debate might serve as a litmus test for 
the inﬂuence of the difference international actors, i.e. help to answer the question which of 
these actors is able to realise its political and economic agenda in ECE.
Notes
1 In the case of ECE, there is only little literature on corporate governance dated before 1995 (Lipton and Sachs 
1990, Lipton and Rosenblum 1991, Frydman et al 1993, Pohl 1994, Dittus 1994).
2Also here there are a few exceptions (for instance Meyer 2003, 2004 and Mygind 2001).
3 However Meyer remains unclear which stakeholders he refers to (state, employees, managers).
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